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REPETITIO	  SENTENTIARUM,	  REPETITIO	  VERBORUM	  KANT,	  HAMANN,	  AND	  THE	  IMPLICATIONS	  OF	  CITATION	  	  
	  
	  	   JOHN	  T.	  HAMILTON	  	  ABSTRACT:	  A	  careful	  comparison	  of	   the	  citational	  practices	  of	   Immanuel	  Kant	  and	  Johann	  Georg	  Hamann	  aims	  to	  divulge	  salient	  distinctions	  that	  should	  contribute	  to	  and	  complicate	  our	  historical	  understanding	  of	   the	  Enlightenment	  project.	  To	   this	  end,	   the	  present	  article	  begins	   by	   investigating	   Kant’s	   famous	   gambit	   in	   his	   response	   to	   the	   question	   “Was	   ist	  Aufklärung?”	  and	  subsequently	  traces	  its	  links	  to	  the	  philosopher’s	  earlier	  engagement	  with	  his	   Königsberg	   neighbor	   regarding	   the	   proposed	   collaboration	   to	   compose	   a	   physics	  textbook	   for	   children.	   What	   emerges	   from	   this	   investigation	   is	   a	   revealing	   and	   at	   times	  confounding	  network	  of	  citations,	  primarily	   from	  Horace,	  which	  serve	   to	   test	   the	   limits	  of	  critical	  discourse.	  At	  stake	  is	  a	  redefinition	  of	  eighteenth-­‐century	  language	  theory	  that	  takes	  into	  consideration	  crucial	  positions	  on	  the	  meaning	  and	  value	  of	  metaphysics,	  theology,	  and	  human	  nature.	  	  	  	  Precisely	  as	  a	  repetition	  of	  language,	  citation	  entails	  an	  act	  of	  speaking	  that	  is	  at	  the	  same	   time	   an	   act	   of	   listening,	   or	   an	   act	   of	   writing	   that	   also	   involves	   an	   act	   of	  reading.1	  Despite	   this	   conjoined	   effort,	   citational	   practice	   tends	   to	   privilege	   one	  aspect	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   other,	   which	   in	   turn	   signals	   how	   language	   itself	   is	  believed	  to	  operate.	  The	  speaker	  or	  writer	  who	  assumes	  the	  role	  of	  an	  assured	  agent	  of	   language	  generally	   implements	   language	  as	  an	   instrument	   for	   communicating	  a	  thought,	  while	  the	  one	  who	  listens	  to	  language	  often	  regards	  the	  words	  themselves	  as	  the	  generative	  source	  of	  thought	  and	  concepts.	  Insofar	  as	  a	  citation	  is	  a	  repetition,	  one	   could	   specify	   the	   former	   case	   as	   a	   repetitio	   sententiarum	   (a	   repetition	   of	  thoughts),	  which	  presumes	  language	  to	  be	  a	  posteriori,	  and	  the	  latter	  as	  a	  repetitio	  
verborum	   (a	  repetition	  of	  words),	  which	   instead	  presumes	   language	   to	  be	  a	  priori.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	   present	   essay	  was	   first	   presented	   as	   the	   Sigmund	  H.	  Danziger	   Lecture	   in	   the	  Department	   of	  Classics	   at	   The	   University	   of	   Chicago,	   and	   subsequently	   at	   Princeton	   University.	   I	   would	   like	   to	  acknowledge	   the	   extremely	   helpful	   questions	   and	   suggestions	   that	   emerged	   during	   the	   discussion	  periods,	  which	   I	   have	   gratefully	   incorporated	   into	   this	   final	   version.	   I	  would	   also	   like	   to	   thank	   the	  anonymous	  readers	  of	  the	  manuscript	  for	  their	  insightful	  and	  useful	  input.	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This	   distinction	   is	   particularly	   acute	   in	   the	   alternative	   approaches	   that	   obtain	   in	  comparing	   the	   citational	   practices	   of	   that	   oddest	   couple	   of	   the	   late	   Eighteenth	  Century,	  Immanuel	  Kant	  and	  Johann	  Georg	  Hamann.	  In	  the	  starkest	  terms,	  whereas	  Kant	   reaches	   for	   language	   in	   order	   to	   transmit	   his	   thinking,	   Hamann	   abides	  with	  language	  as	   the	  determinant	  origin	  of	   thought’s	   content.	  The	   implications	  of	   these	  opposing	  presuppositions,	  however,	  point	  well	  beyond	  considerations	  of	   linguistic	  functions	   and	   instead	   strike	   at	   the	   very	   core	   of	   what	   generally	   counts	   as	   the	  Enlightenment,	   touching	   on	   and	   complicating	   fundamental	   questions	   of	  metaphysics,	  theology,	  and	  ultimately	  human	  nature.	  	  In	   addition	   to	   providing	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	   and	   memorable	  definitions	   of	   the	   European	   Enlightenment,	   the	   opening	   paragraph	   of	   Kant’s	  response	   to	   the	   question	   “Was	   ist	   Aufklärung?”	   (1784)	   already	   broaches	   crucial	  issues	  regarding	  the	  form	  and	  function	  of	  citations	  in	  philosophical	  discourse.	  	  Aufklärung	   ist	   der	   Ausgang	   des	   Menschen	   aus	   seiner	   selbstverschuldeten	  Unmündigkeit.	   Unmündigkeit	   ist	   das	   Unvermögen,	   sich	   seines	   Verstandes	   ohne	  Leitung	  eines	  anderen	  zu	  bedienen.	  Selbstverschuldet	  ist	  diese	  Unmündigkeit,	  wenn	  die	  Ursache	  derselben	  nicht	  am	  Mangel	  des	  Verstandes,	  sondern	  der	  Entschließung	  und	  des	  Muthes	   liegt,	   sich	   seiner	  ohne	  Leitung	  eines	   anderen	   zu	  bedienen.	  Sapere	  
aude!	   Habe	   Muth,	   dich	   deines	   eigenen	   Verstandes	   zu	   bedienen!	   ist	   also	   der	  Wahlspruch	  der	  Aufklärung.	  	   Enlightenment	   is	   man’s	   exit	   from	   his	   self-­‐incurred	   immaturity	   [Unmündigkeit].	  Immaturity	  is	  the	  inability	  to	  use	  one’s	  own	  understanding	  without	  the	  guidance	  of	  another.	   This	   immaturity	   is	   self-­‐incurred	   if	   its	   cause	   is	   not	   lack	   of	   understanding,	  but	  lack	  of	  resolution	  and	  courage	  to	  use	  it	  without	  the	  guidance	  of	  another.	  Sapere	  
aude!	  Have	   courage	   to	   use	   your	   own	   understanding!	   is	   therefore	   the	   motto	   [der	  
Wahlspruch]	  of	  the	  Enlightenment.2	  	  	  Kant’s	   decision	   to	   appropriate	   a	   tagline	   from	  Horace’s	  Epistles	   is	   at	   the	   very	   least	  intriguing.	  Despite	   the	   call	   to	   apply	   one’s	   understanding	   “without	   the	   guidance	   of	  another”	   (ohne	   Leitung	   eines	   anderen)—a	   qualification	   that	   Kant	   apparently	   feels	  compelled	   to	   repeat	   twice	   verbatim—he	   allows	   philosophy	   to	   be	   guided	   by	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 	  Immanuel	   Kant,	   Beantwortung	   der	   Frage:	   Was	   ist	   Aufklärung?	   in	   Kant,	   Gesammelte	   Schriften	  (Akademieausgabe),	  23	  vols.	  (Berlin:	  Preussische	  Akademie	  der	  Wissenschaften,	  1900ff.),	  8:	  33–42,	  here	  33	  (henceforth	  cited	  as	  AA	  with	  volume	  and	  page	  number);	  “An	  Answer	  to	  the	  Question:	  What	  is	  Enlightenment?”	   in	  Kant,	  Political	  Writings,	  H.	  Reiss,	   ed,	  H.B.	  Nisbet,	   trans.	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  54–60,	  here	  54.	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classical	   citation:	   sapere	  aude!	   The	   resolution	   to	   be	   intellectually	   self-­‐sufficient,	   to	  abandon	  one’s	  “self-­‐incurred	  immaturity,”	  is	  expressed	  by	  borrowing	  a	  phrase	  from	  a	  poet.	  The	  exhortation	  to	  think	  for	  oneself	  is	  prescribed	  by	  an	  external	  source.	  The	  courageous	   independence	  of	  one’s	   intellect	   is	  shown	  to	  be	  strikingly	  dependent.	  A	  plea	   for	   autonomy—for	   release	   from	   tutelage,	   for	   authenticity—curiously	   relies,	  still,	  on	  prior	  authority.	  Without	   blinking,	   Kant	   emerges	   from	   the	   condition	   of	   immaturity	   or	  
Unmündigkeit,	  relinquishing	  the	  position	  of	  an	  underage	  child	  who	  has	  no	  voice	  or	  mouth	   (Mund),	   by	  becoming	  a	  mouthpiece	  of	  poetic	   tradition	  or	   even	  by	  allowing	  tradition	   to	   speak	   for	  him,	  here	   in	  a	   text	   that	  explicitly	   challenges	  authorities	   and	  institutions	  that	  act	  as	  Vormünder,	  as	  advocates	  who	  dare	  to	  speak	   in	  the	  people’s	  stead.	  	  Daß	   der	   bei	   weitem	   größte	   Teil	   der	   Menschen	   (darunter	   das	   ganze	   schöne	  Geschlecht)	  den	  Schritt	  zur	  Mündigkeit,	  außer	  dem	  daß	  er	  beschwerlich	  ist,	  auch	  für	  sehr	  gefährlich	  halte:	  dafür	  sorgen	  schon	  jene	  Vormünder,	  die	  die	  Oberaufsicht	  über	  sie	  gütigst	  auf	  sich	  genommen	  haben.	  (AA	  8:	  54)	  	  That	   by	   far	   the	   greatest	   part	   of	   mankind	   (including	   the	   entire	   fair	   sex)	   should	  consider	   the	   step	   toward	   maturity	   [Mündigkeit]	   not	   only	   as	   difficult	   but	   also	   as	  highly	   dangerous:	   those	   guardians	   [Vormünder]	   already	   take	   care	   of	   it,	   they	   who	  have	  kindly	  taken	  upon	  themselves	  the	  task	  of	  supervision.	  	  	  As	   a	   legal	   term,	   Unmündigkeit	   denotes	   the	   incapacity	   for	   self-­‐representation	  exemplified	  by	  the	  case	  of	  children,	  yet	  also	  applicable	  to	  the	  insane,	  the	  senile,	  and	  —as	   Kant	   points	   out—women.	   Powerful	   institutions	   infantalize	   the	   populace	   by	  portraying	   independent	   thinking	   as	   something	   highly	   precarious	   and	   frightening.	  They	  strive	  to	  convince	  society	  that	  entrance	  into	  self-­‐reliance	  should	  be	  restricted	  to	   those	   accompanied	   by	   a	   legal	   guardian.	   In	   Kant’s	   rating	   system,	   too,	  Enlightenment	  is	  decidedly	  for	  mature	  audiences	  only.	  However,	  what	  distinguishes	  the	   philosopher’s	   project	   is	   the	   desire	   to	   encourage	   every	   citizen	   to	   grow	   up—to	  examine,	   judge,	   and	   speak	   for	   oneself.	   	   Thus,	   Kant	   rails	   against	   the	   “laziness	   and	  cowardice”	   (Faulheit	  und	  Feigheit)	   that	   causes	   the	  majority	   to	   “remain	   immature”	  (unmündig	   bleiben),	   long	   after	   they	   have	   naturally	   come	   of	   age.	   Nonetheless,	   as	  already	  indicated,	  Kant	  does	  not	  hesitate	  to	  import	  language	  from	  other	  sources.	  He	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not	   only	   cites	   natural	   law	   (naturaliter	  maiorénnes)	   but	   also,	  more	   emphatically,	   a	  poet.	   	  He	  lets	  Horace	  be	  his	  spokesman,	  even	  if	  only	  in	  passing.	  With	  one	  hand,	  he	  decries	   the	   “rules	   and	   formulas”	   (Satzungen	   und	   Formeln),	   that	   mechanically	  operate	   as	   “the	   foot-­‐cuffs	   of	   a	   perpetual	   immaturity”	   (die	   Fußschellen	   einer	  
immerwährenden	   Unmündigkeit),	   while,	   with	   the	   other	   hand	   he	   cites	   a	   poetic	  formula,	  implicitly	  footnoted,	  making	  it	  moreover	  into	  the	  slogan	  of	  autonomy,	  into	  the	  very	  motto	   (der	  Wahlspruch)	  of	   the	  Enlightenment,	   seemingly	  unaware	  of	   any	  contradiction	  or	  irony	  (AA	  8:	  33-­‐34).	  	  All	   the	  same,	   it	   really	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	   that	  Kant	  expresses	  even	  the	   notion	   of	   intellectual	   independence	   by	   means	   of	   a	   Latin	   quotation.	   Since	  Antiquity,	  thinkers	  have	  been	  drawn	  to	  the	  pithy	  utterance,	  the	  concise	  maxim,	  the	  well-­‐coined	   phrase.	   Modern	   writers,	   from	   the	   Renaissance	   of	   Machiavelli	   and	  Montaigne	  straight	  through	  to	  Kant’s	  Eighteenth	  Century	  and	  beyond,	  inherited	  the	  ancients’	   inclination	   to	   harvest	   key	   insights,	   precepts	   and	   viewpoints	   from	   the	  poetic	   tradition,	   not	   out	   of	   “laziness”	   or	   “cowardice,”	   but	   rather	   in	   order	   to	  communicate	  their	  own	  positions	  with	  concision	  and	  cogency.	  For	  Quintilian	  there	  is	  an	  obvious,	  authoritative	  value	  in	  the	  “maxims	  of	  poets”	  (sententiae	  poetarum):	  	  nam	  sententiis	  quidem	  poetarum	  non	  orationes	  modo	  sunt	  refertae	  sed	  libri	  etiam	  philosophorum,	   qui	   quanquam	   inferiora	   omnia	   praeceptis	   suis	   ac	   litteris	   credunt,	  repetere	   tamen	   auctoritatem	   a	   plurimis	   versibus	   non	   fastidierunt.	   (Inst.	   orat.	  5.11.39)	  	  For	   not	   only	   are	   speeches	   full	   of	   maxims	   from	   the	   poets,	   but	   also	   the	   books	   of	  philosophers,	   who,	   though	   they	   believe	   everything	   to	   be	   inferior	   to	   their	   own	  precepts	  and	  writings,	  have	  not	  disdained	  to	  draw	  on	  [repetere]	  the	  authority	  from	  great	  numbers	  of	  verses.	  	  	  	  Poetic	   turns	   of	   phrase	   lend	   authority	   to	   philosophical	   disquisitions.	   Even	   those	  thinkers	  most	  skeptical	  of	  public	  opinion	  were	  captivated	  by	  the	  forcefulness	  of	  the	  apothegm,	   the	   proverb,	   and	   the	   gnomic	   utterance,	   appreciating	   their	   potential	  contribution	   to	   thoughtful	   reflection.	   In	   Plato’s	   Protagoras,	   for	   instance,	   Socrates	  expresses	  admiration	  for	  the	  Spartans’	  capacity	  to	  philosophize:3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  On	   the	   tension	   between	   intellectual	   autonomy	   and	   heteronomy	   in	   the	  Protagoras,	   see	   Charles	   L.	  Griswold,	  Jr.,	  “Relying	  on	  Your	  Own	  Voice:	  An	  Unsettled	  Rivalry	  of	  Moral	  Ideas	  in	  Plato’s	  Protagoras,”	  
	   5	  
	  εἰ	  γὰρ	  ἐθέλει	  τις	  Λακεδαιμονίων	  τῷ	  φαυλοτάτῳ	  συγγενέσθαι,	  τὰ	  μὲν	  πολλὰ	  
ἐν	  τοῖς	  λόγοις	  εὑρήσει	  αὐτὸν	  φαῦλόν	  τινα	  φαινόμενον,	  ἔπειτα	  ὅπου	  ἂν	  τύχῃ	  	  τῶν	   λεγομένων,	   ἐνέβαλεν	   ῥῆμα	   ἄξιον	   λόγου	   βραχὺ	   καὶ	   συνεστραμμένον	  
ὥσπερ	   δεινὸς	   ἀκοντιστής,	  ὥστε	   φαίνεσθαι	   τὸν	   προσδιαλεγόμενον	   παιδὸς	  μηδὲν	  βελτίω	  (Prot.	  342d–e).	  	  	   For	  if	  anyone	  is	  willing	  to	  associate	  with	  the	  most	  ordinary	  Lacedaemonian,	  he	  will	  find	  him	  for	  the	  most	  part	  to	  appear	  ordinary	  in	  his	  speech;	  but	  then	  by	  chance,	  at	  some	   point	   in	   the	   conversation,	   all	   at	   once,	   like	   a	   skillful	   lancer,	   he	   hurls	   forth	   a	  valuable	   remark,	   brief	   and	   condensed,	   so	   that	   his	   interlocutor	   appears	   no	   better	  than	  a	  child.	  	  	  Socrates	   goes	   on	   to	   attribute	   to	   Spartan	   ingenuity	   the	   seminal	   maxims	   of	   “know	  thyself”	  and	   “nothing	   in	  excess,”	  which	  were	   inscribed	  on	   the	  Temple	   to	  Apollo	  at	  Delphi,	   in	   order	   to	  demonstrate	  how	   the	   first	   philosophers	   exhibited	   this	   “laconic	  brevity”	   (βραχυλογία	   Λακωνική,	   343b).	   Kant’s	   nomination	   of	   sapere	  aude	  belongs	  precisely	   to	   this	   venerable	   tradition	   of	   appropriating	   the	   efficacy	   of	   a	   succinct	  dictum.	   Indeed,	   how	   better	   to	   emerge	   from	  Unmündigkeit	   than	   by	   reducing	   one’s	  formidable	  Vormünder	  to	  the	  level	  of	  helpless	  children!	  	  Of	  course,	  Socrates’	  irony	  should	  not	  be	  overlooked.	  Elsewhere,	  for	  example	  in	   the	   Gorgias,	   he	   rails	   against	   the	   kind	   of	   sophistry	   that	   cleverly	   piles	   on	   terse	  poetic	   citations	   in	   the	   course	   of	   a	   refutation—a	   practice	   that	   he	   dismisses	   as	   a	  dubious	   method	   for	   discovering	   the	   truth.4	  Nonetheless,	   as	   in	   the	   Ion,	   Socrates	  cannot	  deny	  the	  sheer	  force	  of	  poetic	  recitation,	  which	  derives	   its	  magnetic	  power	  from	  the	  divine	  Muses.5	  Moreover,	  one	  need	  only	  recall	  the	  Delphic	  dictum,	  “Know	  thyself”	   and	   the	   central,	   motivating	   role	   it	   played	   in	   Socrates’s	   philosophical	  mission.	  	  In	   drawing	   from	   the	   Horatian	   source,	   Kant	   apparently	  wants	   to	   enlist	   this	  kind	   of	   power.	   His	   usage	   does	   not	   necessarily	   imply	   dependence	   as	   much	   as	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Review	  of	  Metaphysics	  53	  (1999),	  283–307.	  	  For	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  Spartans’	  reputed	  brevity	  in	   speech,	   see	   E.D.	   Francis,	   “Brachylogia	   Laconica,”	   BICS	   38	   (1991–93),	   198–212;	   and	   E.	   David,	  “Sparta’s	  Kosmos	  of	  Silence,”	   in	  Sparta:	  New	  Perspectives,	  S.	  Hodkinson	  and	  A.	  Powell,	  eds.	  (London,	  1999),	  117–46.	  	  	  4	  See	  Plato,	  Gorgias	  471e	  –	  472a.	  	  5	  Plato,	  Ion	  536a.	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recalls	   a	   notion	   of	   authorship	   that	   regards	   the	   auctor	  not	   only	   as	   the	   creator	   or	  originator	  of	  discourse	  but	  also	  as	  the	  one	  who	  preserves	  prior	  auctoritas,	  granting	  it	  continued	  existence	  or	  even	  a	  kind	  of	  permanence	  by	  vouching	  for	  its	  veracity	  or	  present	  relevance.	  By	  evoking	  the	  Latin	  imperative—sapere	  aude!—Kant	  can	  hardly	  be	   charged	  with	   dogmatism.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   he	   strives	   to	   reveal	   a	   fundamental,	  universal	  trait	  of	  human,	  intellectual	  courage,	  reminding	  his	  readers	  of	  what	  Horace	  already	  knew,	  hoping	  to	  reawaken	  a	  spirit	  of	  independent	  inquiry	  that	  is	  otherwise	  silenced	  by	   the	  Church,	   the	   State,	   and	  other	   oppressive	   institutions.	  Against	   these	  intimidating	   sovereigns,	   Kant	   summons	   Horace	   to	   marshal	   a	   counter-­‐force,	   to	  inspire	  intellectual	  self-­‐sufficiency	  and	  autonomy.	  The	  philosopher,	  therefore,	  does	  not	   succumb	   to	   power	   as	  much	   as	   he	   draws	   it	   to	   his	   side;	   and	   this	   alignment	   of	  power	  entails	  reciprocal	  effects:	   In	  the	  course	  of	   legitimizing	  his	  own	  discourse	  by	  means	  of	  citation,	  Kant	  also	  establishes	  Horace’s	   legitimacy	  for	  the	  Enlightenment.	  That	   is,	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	   the	   transference	  and	  maintenance	  of	  power,	  one	   that	  confirms	  the	  authority	  cited,	  while	  empowering	  the	  author	  who	  cites.6	  	  	  This	   conjoined	   power	   enhances	   philosophical	   presentation	   and	   has	  consistently	   contributed	   to	   its	   clout	   and	   validity.	   As	   Aristotle	   notes	   in	   his	  
Metaphysics,	   quotation	   is	   one	   of	   three	   viable	   methods	   for	   granting	   a	   discourse	  credibility	  and	  currency:	  	  οἱ	  μὲν	  οὖν	  ἐὰν	  μὴ	  μαθηματικῶς	  λέγῃ	  τις	  οὐκ	  ἀποδέχονται	  τῶν	  λεγόντων,	  οἱ	  δ᾽ἂν	  μὴ	  παραδειγματικῶς,	  οἱ	  δὲ	  μάρτυρα	  ἀξιοῦσιν	  ἐπάγεσθαι	  ποιητήν.	  (Met.	  2,	  995a7–8)	  	  Some	   people	   do	   not	   accept	   statements	   unless	   you	   express	   them	   mathematically;	  others,	   unless	  by	  way	  of	   examples;	  while	   others	  deem	   that	   one	   call	   in	   a	  poet	   as	   a	  witness.	  	  Along	   with	  mathematical	   proofs	   and	   paradigmatic	   illustrations,	   poetic	   quotations	  find	   their	   place	   in	   ancient	   philosophical	   discussions	   precisely	   as	   items	   that	  recipients	  “deem	  valuable”	  (ἀξιοῦσιν),	  like	  the	  “valuable	  remark”	  (ῥῆμα	  ἄξιον)	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Cf.	   Peter	  Pütz,	   “Autorität	   durch	  Wiederholung:	  Von	  der	  Herrschaft	   des	   Zitats,”	   in	  Autorität	  der/in	  
Sprache:	  Literatur,	  Neue	  Medien,	  J.	  Fohrmann,	  ed.	  (Bielefeld:	  Aisthesis,	  1999):	  694–704;	  here,	  695.	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Socrates	   found	   so	   impressive	   among	   the	  Spartans.7	  Should	  a	  philosopher	   strive	   to	  ascertain	   and	   impart	   knowledge,	   he	   would	   be	   expected	   to	   deal	   directly	   with	   the	  anterior	  body	  of	  sophia	  displayed	  by	  the	  poets.	  Accordingly,	  for	  an	  audience	  steeped	  in	   poetic	   culture,	   it	   is	   worthwhile	   to	   summon	   a	   poet’s	   voice,	   either	   for	   points	   of	  verification	  or	  contestation.	  	  Aristotle’s	  verb	  for	  “invoking,	  introducing,	  or	  calling	  in”—ἐπάγεσθαι—a	  term	  almost	  perfectly	  replicated	  in	  the	  modern	  German	  anführen,	  engages	  the	  metaphor	  of	  calling	  someone	  in	  as	  a	  witness	  before	  a	  judging	  party,	  of	  summoning	  a	  person	  in	  court	   to	   provide	   testimony.	   The	   juridical	   image	   is	   further	   operative	   in	   the	   Latin	  
citare,	  which	   is	  composed	   from	  the	  perfect	  passive	  participle	  of	  ciēre	  (“to	  cause	   to	  move,	  stir,	  drive,	  or	  shake”)	  and	  cognate	  with	  the	  Greek	  κινεῖν	  (“to	  put	  in	  motion”).	  	  A	   passage	   cited	   is	   one	   that	   has	   been	   called	   to	   appear,	   made	   to	   move	   from	   one	  context	   to	   another,	   perhaps	   even	   shaken	   loose	   from	   its	   initial	   setting.	   Yet,	   this	  kinetic	   energy	   is	   not	   always	   amenable	   to	   control—the	   citation	   as	   attestant	   or	  testifier	  always	  stands	  in	  a	  position	  to	  become	  a	  hostile	  witness.	  This	  possibility	  is	  grounded	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   testimony	  adduced	  by	   citation	   can	  never	  be	  entirely	  absorbed	  by	  the	  new,	  incorporating	  text.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  synchronic	  axis	  (how	  the	  citation	  relates	  to	  the	  present	  discourse),	  there	  is	  also	  the	  diachronic	  axis	  (how	  the	  citing	  text	  relates	  back	  to	  the	  cited	  discourse);	  and	  the	  energy	  that	  is	  ignited	  by	  the	  friction	   between	   the	   synchronic	   and	   the	   diachronic,	   between	   repetition	   and	  difference,	  derivation	  and	  innovation—also	  stands	  to	  disrupt	  the	  adoptive	  context.8	  	  In	  Kant’s	  essay,	  the	  potential	  disruption	  is	  signaled	  by	  the	  verbal	  intrusion	  of	  the	  citation,	  which	  is	  both	  lexically	  and	  typographically	  marked.	  In	  hitting	  upon	  the	  italicized	   phrase	   sapere	   aude,	   the	   person	   who	   reads	   Kant’s	   piece	   encounters	   an	  opening	  that	  leads	  away	  from	  the	  text	  at	  hand	  and	  toward	  prior	  sources.	  Needless	  to	  say,	   the	   first	   step	  onto	   this	   intertextual	  path	  would	  be	   to	   consult,	  with	  or	  without	  Kant’s	  sanction,	  the	  second	  poem	  from	  Horace’s	  first	  book	  of	  Epistles.	  Here,	  the	  poet	  attempts	   to	   persuade	   Lollius	   Maximus,	   a	   young	   student	   of	   rhetoric,	   to	   devote	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  On	   the	  value	  and	   function	  of	  poetic	  quotations	   in	  ancient	  philosophy,	   see	  Stephen	  Halliwell,	   “The	  Subjection	  of	  Muthos	  to	  Logos:	  Plato’s	  Citation	  of	  the	  Poets,”	  Classical	  Quarterly	  50	  (2000):	  94–112.	  	  8	  See	   Stefan	   Morawski,	   “The	   Basic	   Function	   of	   Quotation,”	   in	   Sign,	   Language,	   Culture,	   C.H.	   van	  Schooneveld,	  ed.	  (The	  Hague:	  Mouton,	  1970),	  690–705,	  here	  692.	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himself	   to	   the	   Homeric	   poems	   as	   a	   repository	   of	   moral	   philosophical	   precepts.	  Rather	  than	  waste	  one’s	  youth	  on	  the	  pursuit	  of	  wealth	  and	  pleasure,	  like	  Penelope’s	  suitors,	   one	   should	   devote	   serious	   time	   to	   studying	   the	   principles	   of	   virtue	   and	  wisdom	  by	  way	  of	  exemplary	  poetry,	  before	  it	  is	  too	  late:	  	   dimidium	  facti	  qui	  coepit	  habet;	  sapere	  aude;	  incipe!	  qui	  recte	  vivendi	  prorogat	  horam,	  rusticus	  exspectat	  dum	  defluat	  amnis;	  at	  ille	  labitur	  et	  labetur	  in	  omne	  volubilis	  aevum.	  	   	   	   	   	   (Horace,	  Epist.	  1.2.40–4)	  	  	  He	  who	  begins	  has	  half	  the	  deed	  done:	  dare	  to	  be	  wise:	  begin!	  He	  who	  postpones	  the	  hour	  of	  living	  rightly,	  is	  like	  the	  farmer	  who	  waits	  for	  the	  river	  to	  run	  off;	  but	  the	  river	  flows	  past	  and	  will	  flow,	  rolling	  along	  for	  all	  time.	  	  Horace’s	   eminently	   quotable	   bid	   (sapere	   aude)	   itself	   follows	   on	   the	   heels	   of	  proverbial	   wisdom:	   dimidium	   facti	   qui	   coepit	   habet,	   which	   translates	   the	   Greek	  adage,	  Ἀρχὴ	   δέ	   τοι	  ἥμισυ	   παντός,	   an	   utterance	   that	  would	   continue	   its	   career	   in	  most	  European	  languages:	   for	   instance,	   in	  the	  French	  (Il	  est	  bien	  avancé,	  qui	  a	  bien	  
commencé),	   the	   German	   (Frisch	   gewagt	   ist	   halb	   gewonnen),	   or	   the	   English	   (Once	  
begun	  is	  half	  done).	  In	  Horace’s	  epistle,	  it	  is	  this	  gnomic	  keenness	  that	  characterizes	  the	  poet’s	  advice	  as	  especially	  paternal	  and	  direct.	  	  	  Returning	   to	   Kant’s	   usage,	   what	   the	   initial	   poetic	   context	   reveals	   is	   that	  
sapere	  aude	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  moral	  and	  not	  a	  cognitive	  sense.	  In	  Horace’s	  poem,	   the	   command	   refers	   to	   the	   careful	   study	   of	   epic	   poetry,	   and	   not,	   as	   Kant	  implies,	  a	  resolute	  rejection	  of	  dogmatic	  guidance.	  Kant’s	  exhortation,	  calling	  for	  the	  intellectual	   emancipation	   from	   the	   “guidance	   of	   another,”	   contrasts	  with	  Horace’s	  initial	   recommendation,	  which	  promotes	  Homer	   as	   a	  moral	   advisor	  of	   virtue.	   It	   is	  noteworthy	  that	  Horace	  suggests	  the	  reading	  of	  poetry	  and	  not	  philosophy	  for	  moral	  instruction.	   Although	   both	  Horace	   and	  Kant	   allude	   to	   hesitation	   and	   childishness,	  the	  philosopher’s	  admonition—“dare	  to	  know,”	  dare	  to	  have	  the	  courage	  to	  use	  your	  own	  understanding”—is	  addressed	  to	  someone	  who	  lacks	  scientific	  curiosity,	  while	  the	  poet’s	  encouragement,	   “dare	  to	  study	  true	  wisdom,”	   is	  aimed	  at	   the	  hedonistic	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procrastinator,	  who,	  like	  a	  foolish	  rustic,	  refuses	  to	  cross	  the	  river	  until	  the	  waters	  run	  dry.	  	  In	   summoning	   the	   phrase	   sapere	   aude,	   Kant	   may	   have	   been	  motivated	   by	  Pierre	  Gassendi,	  who,	  a	  century	  earlier,	  had	  already	  refitted	  Horace’s	  admonition	  to	  express	   a	  modern	   appeal	   for	   free	   inquiry.	   Gassendi,	   who	   imprinted	   all	   his	   books	  with	  the	  Horatian	  line,	  enlisted	  the	  phrase	  to	  argue	  explicitly	  against	  virtue,	  which	  the	  scientist	  regarded	  as	  conformity	  to	  a	  norm.	  For	  Gassendi,	  himself	  a	  precursor	  of	  the	  Enlightenment,	  sapere	  aude	  should	  inspire	  the	  boldness	  required	  for	  the	  fearless	  application	   of	   critical	   reason.9	  The	   same	   intention	   is	   discernible	   in	   an	   earlier	   text	  that	  Kant	  published	  a	  year	  before	  the	  Aufklärung	  essay,	  namely	  his	  Prolegomena	  to	  
any	  Future	  Metaphysics,	  which	  also	   includes	  a	   reference	   to	  Horace’s	   epistle.	   In	   the	  introductory	  pages,	  Kant	  addresses	  philosophers	  who	  have	  hitherto	  been	  reluctant	  to	   pose	   the	   simple	   question,	   “Whether	   such	   a	   thing	   as	   metaphysics	   is	   at	   all	  possible?”	   (AA	   4:	   255).	   According	   to	   Kant,	   the	   reason	   why	   philosophers	   have	  hesitated	   to	   ask	   this	   fundamental	   question	   is	   because,	   by	   inquiring	   into	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   science,	   one	   implicitly	   doubts	   its	   actuality.	   For	   Kant,	   this	  sheepishness	   is	   yet	   another	   instance	   of	   the	   cowardice	   that	   obstructs	   the	  establishment	   and	   elaboration	   of	   sound	  metaphysics.	   The	   “reader	  who	   thinks	   for	  himself”	  (der	  selbstdenkende	  Leser)	  must	  not	  cower	  in	  apprehension,	  for	  the	  demand	  to	   form	   the	   foundations	   of	   any	   future	   metaphysics	   will	   not	   disappear	   merely	   by	  neglecting	   to	   cross	   the	   treacherous	  waters	  of	  doubt.	  To	   illustrate,	  Kant	   appends	  a	  footnote	   that	   simply	   cites	   the	   simile	   from	  Horace’s	   epistle	   (rusticus	   exspectat	   [AA	  4:257]).	  	  In	  essence,	  Kant	  uses	  Horace’s	  words	  to	  express	  his	  own	  ideas.	  He	  employs	  Horace’s	   utterance	   without	   full	   regard	   for	   the	   initial	   act	   of	   utterance—the	  
énonciation	   is	   subordinated	   to	   or	   dissolves	   into	   the	   énoncé.	   This	   verbal	  appropriation	  clearly	  correlates	  to	  the	  free	  use	  of	  reason:	  the	  capacity	  to	  repurpose	  or	   even	   abuse	   an	   inherited	   quotation	   corresponds	   to	   the	   rational	   autonomy	   that	  Kant	  champions	  throughout	  his	  piece.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  Kant	  reduces	  the	  intrusion	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  For	   an	   overview	   of	  modern	   adoptions	   of	   the	  Horatian	  motto,	   see	   Franco	  Venturi,	   “Sapere	   aude!”	  
Revista	  storica	  italiana	  71	  (1959):	  119–28.	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of	  the	  quoted	  text	  to	  a	  minimum.	  A	  reader	  may	  or	  may	  not	  stammer	  at	  the	  sudden	  appearance	  of	  a	  poetic	  citation	   in	  Kant’s	  philosophical	  exposition;	   the	  point	   is	  that	  this	   reader	   is	   expected	   to	   move	   past	   the	   interruption	   without	   further	   ado,	   to	  continue	  reading	  Kant’s	  essay	  rather	  than	  pause	  and	  reach	  for	  an	  edition	  of	  Horace’s	  
Epistles.	  To	  be	  sure,	  Kant	  repeats	  Horace’s	  language,	  but	  it	  is	  specifically	  a	  repetition	  of	  an	  idea,	  a	  repetitio	  sententiae,	  an	  idea,	  moreover,	  that	  Kant	  himself	  aims	  to	  steer	  with	  rational,	  sovereign	  control.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  signified—that	  which	  is	  presented	  as	   ideational	   content—must	   take	  precedence	  over	   the	   initial	   form	   that	   voiced	   the	  signifiers;	   the	   vox	   and	   its	   words	   (verba)	   must	   yield	   to	   the	   thought	   expressed	   in	  words	   or	   the	   sententia.10	  Kant	   is	   more	   concerned	   with	   communicating	   a	   thought	  than	  with	  transmitting	  the	  discourse	  that	  mediates	  the	  thought.	  Although	  necessary	  for	  transmission,	  Kant’s	  exposition	  relies	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  vanishing	  medium:	  once	  the	  idea	  is	  received,	  the	  discourse	  itself	  is	  dispensable.	  A	  writer	  who	  is	  simply	  content	  to	  repeat	  words,	  to	  insert	  into	  his	  or	  her	  text	  a	  repetitio	  verborum,	  is,	  at	  least	  in	   Kant’s	   assessment,	   as	   foolish	   as	   an	   underage	   child	   or	   a	   farmer	  waiting	   for	   the	  river	  to	  drain	  out.	  	  	  It	  is	  precisely	  this	  kind	  of	  foolishness	  or	  childishness	  that	  we	  discover	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Kant’s	   fellow	   neighbor	   in	   Königsberg,	   his	   rather	   difficult	   friend,	   Johann	   Georg	  Hamann.	   Hamann’s	   writings,	   which	   are	   generally	   regarded	   as	   documents	   of	   a	  counter-­‐Enlightenment,	  are	  indeed	  notoriously	  obscure,	  dense	  and	  abstruse,	  at	  once	  pious	  and	  humorous,	  ironic	  and	  bawdy,	  perplexingly	  digressive	  and	  saturated	  with	  countless	   allusions	   and	   citations	   from	   the	   Bible,	   Greco-­‐Roman	   antiquity	   and	  European	   letters.	   As	  Goethe	   famously	   quipped,	  when	   reading	  Hamann,	   “one	  must	  completely	  rule	  out	  what	  one	  normally	  means	  by	  understanding.”11	  The	  difficulty	  of	  Hamann’s	   work	   may	   be	   explained	   by	   his	   refusal	   to	   follow	   the	   principle	   of	   the	  
vanishing	  medium.	   For	   him,	   discourse,	   which	   is	   bound	   to	   a	   unique	   historical	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  For	  further	  discussion,	  see	  Antoine	  Compagnon,	  La	  seconde	  main,	  ou	  le	  travail	  de	  la	  citation	  (Paris:	  Seuils,	  1979),	  149.	  	  11	  Johann	  Wolfgang	   von	   Goethe,	  Aus	  meinem	  Leben:	  Dichtung	  und	  Wahrheit,	   in	  Werke	   (Hamburger	  Ausgabe),	   14	   vols.,	   E.	   Trunz,	   ed.	   (Munich:	   Deutscher	   Taschenbuch	   Verlag,	   1981),	   9:	   515.	   For	   an	  excellent	   overview	   of	   Hamann’s	   early	   reception,	   see	   Johann	  Georg	  Hamann:	  Der	  hellste	  Kopf	   seiner	  
Zeit,	  O.	  Bayer,	  ed.	  (Tübingen:	  Attempo,	  1998).	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cultural	   context,	   is	  never	  simply	  dispensable.	  The	  words	  of	   the	  discourse—that	   is,	  the	   concrete	   verba—possess	   value	   in	   themselves.	   Hamann’s	   writings	   are	   replete	  with	  citations	  because	  citations	  are	  examples	  of	  language	  that	  are	  not	  exhausted	  in	  their	  original	  enunciation;	  they	  persist	  beyond	  their	  initial	  purpose,	  having	  broken	  free	   of	   the	   primary	   communication,	   while	   still	   retaining	   the	   qualities	   of	   their	  provenance.	   This	   liberation	   from	   and	   continuation	   of	   the	   first	   communicative	  context	  is	  the	  earmark	  of	  poetic	  discourse,	  which	  is	  thereby	  distinguished	  from	  the	  ordinary	  speech	  that	  treats	   language	  as	  a	  perishable	  commodity.12	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  Hamann’s	  approach	  reveals	  a	  disavowal	  on	  Kant’s	  part:	  Kant	  cites	  Horace	  to	  lend	  a	  certain	  value	  to	  his	  own	  discourse,	  yet	  he	  does	  so	  by	  enforcing	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  poetic	  medium—a	  medium	  that	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  very	  source	  of	  the	  value	  he	  wishes	  to	  exploit.	  In	  striving	  to	  make	  his	  own,	  new	  thought	  visible,	  Kant	  must	  render	  the	  old,	  initial	   discursive	   situation	   invisible.	   The	   fate	   of	   Lollius’s	   moral	   education	   should	  have	  no	  bearing	  on	  Kant’s	  project	  of	  enlightenment.	  In	  contrast,	  Hamann	  insists	  on	  savoring	  the	  discourse	  itself,	  indulging	  in	  its	  depth	  and	  opacity.	  His	  starting	  point	  is	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  every	  devout	  Christian:	  In	  principio	  erat	  Verbum.	  Rather	  than	  follow	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   vanishing	   medium,	   Hamann	   attends	   to	   the	   principal	  medium,	   the	   human	   verba,	   which	   he	   takes	   to	   be	   analogous	   to	   the	   redemptive	  
Verbum.	  	  	  The	  contrast	  between	  Kant’s	  and	  Hamann’s	  practices	  of	  citation	  is	  especially	  vivid	   in	   their	   exchange	   from	   1759,	   regarding	   Kant’s	   proposal	   to	   collaborate	   on	   a	  physics	   primer	   for	   children—a	  project	   that	  Kant	   had	  hoped	  would	   lure	  his	   friend	  back	  to	  the	  side	  of	  enlightened	  free	  thought	  and	  thus	  temper	  the	  religious	  fanaticism	  that	  Hamann	  had	  been	  exhibiting	  since	  his	  recent	  major	  conversion	  in	  London.13	  	  At	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Cf.	  Gian	  Biagio	  Conte,	  The	  Rhetoric	  of	  Imitation:	  Genre	  and	  Poetic	  Memory	  in	  Vergil	  and	  Other	  Latin	  
Poets,	   C.	   Segal,	   ed.	   (Ithaca:	   Cornell	   University	   Press,	   1986),	   41.	   I	   borrow	   the	   phrase	   “perishable	  commodity”	  from	  Conte.	  	  13	  On	  the	  proposed	  project	   to	  collaborate	  on	  the	  physics	  book	   for	  children,	  see	  Reiner	  Wild,	   “Natur	  und	  Offenbarung:	  Hamanns	  und	  Kants	   gemeinsamer	  Plan	   zu	   einer	  Physik	   für	  Kinder,”	   in	  Geist	  und	  
Zeichen:	  Festschrift	  für	  Arthur	  Henkel	  zu	  seinem	  sechzigsten	  Geburtstag,	  H.	  Anton,	  B.	  Gajek,	  and	  P.	  Pfaff,	  ed.	  (Heidelberg:	  Winter,	  1977),	  452–68;	  Hans	  Graubner,	  “Physikotheologie	  und	  Kinderphysik:	  Kants	  und	   Hamanns	   Plan	   zu	   einer	   Physik	   für	   Kinder	   in	   der	   physikotheologischen	   Tradition	   des	   18.	  Jahrhunderts,”	  in	  Johann	  Georg	  Hamann	  und	  die	  Krise	  der	  Aufklärung,	  Acta	  des	  fünften	  internationalen	  
Hamann-­Kolloquiums	  (1988),	  B.	  Gajek	  and	  A.	  Meier,	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Lang,	  1990),	  117–45;	  and	  John	  R.	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first,	   Kant	   plotted	   with	   Hamann’s	   employer,	   Johann	   Christoph	   Berens,	   who	   was	  equally	   troubled	   by	   their	   friend’s	   extreme	   religiosity,	   and	   suggested	   that	  Hamann	  translate	   portions	   of	   Diderot’s	   Encyclopédie—a	   proposal	   that	   Hamann	   flatly	  dismissed.	  Kant	  subsequently	  replied	  with	  the	  children’s	  physics	  project.	  This	  time,	  Hamann’s	  interest	  was	  sparked.	  	  In	  his	  idiosyncratic	  fashion,	  Hamann	  entertains	  the	  plan,	  while	  assuming	  an	  altogether	   playful,	   whimsical	   tone.	   In	   his	   first	   letter	   in	   response	   to	   Kant,	   before	  inscribing	  any	  greeting,	  Hamann	  opens	  with	  an	  epigraph	  from	  Horace’s	  Odes	  1.27:	  	   —	  —ah!	  miser,	  Quanta	  laboras	  in	  Charybdi	  Digne	  puer	  meliore	  flamma!	  	  —	  —ah!	  wretched	  one,	  how	  much	  you	  labor	  in	  Charybdis	  a	  boy	  worthy	  of	  a	  better	  flame!	  	  	   	   	   	   	   (Horace,	  Odes	  1.27.18–20)	  	  Hamann,	   too,	   shakes	   some	   lines	   out	   of	   their	   initial	   context	   to	   speak	   to	   new	  circumstances.	  Whereas	  Horace’s	  ode	  teases	  a	  young	  man	  wounded	  by	  a	  disastrous	  love	  affair,	  Hamann	  applies	  the	  verses	  to	  lament	  the	  vain	  labors	  of	  his	  friend,	  who,	  he	   suggests,	   is	   being	   drawn	   down	   into	   the	   horrifying	   whirlpool	   of	   philosophical	  rationalism.14	  The	   epigraph	   implies	   that	   Kant	   is	   the	  miser	  puer,	   the	  wretched	   boy	  who	   fancies	   himself	   to	   be	   mature	   enough	   to	   brave	   the	   monstrous	   maelstrom.	  Horace	   interestingly	   evades	   mentioning	   Charybdis’s	   twinned	   threat,	   Scylla,	   and	  instead	  speaks	  of	  a	  “better	  flame.”	  What,	  then,	  would	  represent	  this	  improved	  love	  affair	   for	   Hamann?	  Moreover,	  would	   this	   erotic	   investment	   be	  without	   danger	   or	  would	  it	  be	  but	  another	  monster	  posing	  as	  a	  blessing?	  Given	  Hamann’s	  insistence	  on	  Christian	   conversion,	   the	   alternative	   to	   the	   frightening	   whirlpool	   of	   pure	   reason	  might	  well	  be	  understood	  as	  religious	  faith,	  as	  an	  open	  engagement	  with	  God,	  which	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  achieved	  without	  sacrifice	  and	  therefore	  risk.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Betz,	   After	   Enlightenment:	   The	   Post-­Secular	   Vision	   of	   J.G.	   Hamann	   (Oxford:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	   2009),	  84–87.	  	  14	  Cf.	  Betz,	  After-­Enlightenment,	  84–85.	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In	  addition	  to	  staging	  a	  structured	  dilemma,	  and	  emphatically	  unlike	  Kant’s	  own	   use	   of	   citation,	   which	   passes	   over	   the	   initial	   discursive	   situation,	   Hamann	  allows	   Horace’s	   erotic	   setting	   to	   impinge	   upon	   and	   color	   his	   message.	   Tellingly,	  when	  Hamann	  publishes	  his	   first	   two	  replies	   to	  Kant,	  he	   titles	   them	  specifically	  as	  “Two	   Love	   Letters”	   (Zugabe	   zweener	   Liebesbriefe).15	  That	   is	   to	   say,	   in	   contrast	   to	  Kant’s	   citational	  practice,	  Hamann	   invites	   the	   reader	   to	   consult	  Horace’s	   erotically	  driven	   poem.16	  He	   does	   not	   neglect	   the	   original	   énonciation	   in	   favor	   of	   a	   more	  amenable	   énoncé,	   but	   rather	   allows	   it	   to	   intrude,	   to	   cause	   an	   interruption,	   to	  transform	   his	   consideration	   of	   a	   scholarly	   proposal	   into	   a	   personal	   love	   letter.	  Rather	  than	  gloss	  over	  the	  consequences	  of	  his	  citation’s	  provenance,	  Hamann	  gives	  free	   rein	   to	   the	   ramifications	  of	  performing	  a	  repetitio	  verborum.	   It	   takes	  a	  boy	   to	  know	  one.	  	  In	   starting	   the	   letter	  proper,	  Hamann	  maintains	   the	  amorous	  context	  while	  brusquely	  shifting	  metaphors,	  not	  without	  sarcasm:	  	  Die	   Gönner	   Ihrer	   Verdienste	   würden	   vor	   Mitleiden	   die	   Achseln	   zucken,	   wenn	   sie	  wüßten,	  daß	  Sie	  mit	  einer	  Kinderphysick	  schwanger	  giengen	  (369).	  	  The	   benefactors	   of	   your	  merits	  would	   shrug	   their	   shoulders	   in	   pity,	   if	   they	   knew	  that	  you	  went	  about	  pregnant	  with	  a	  children’s	  physics	  book.	  	  	  The	   guiding	   image,	   which	   relates	   authorship	   to	   childbearing,	   in	   addition	   to	  transfiguring	   the	   addressed	   philosopher	   from	   a	   miserable	   adolescent	   to	   an	  expectant	   mother,	   also	   alludes	   to	   that	   key	   philosophical	   tradition	   instigated	   in	  Plato’s	  Symposium,	  where	  Diotima,	  in	  her	  famous	  account	  of	  Eros,	  distinguishes	  the	  two	  alternate	  drives	  for	  achieving	  immortality.	  In	  Diotima’s	  view,	  of	  course,	  “all	  men	  are	  pregnant”:	  some	  seek	  to	  reproduce	  corporeally,	  while	  others	  strive	  to	  engender	  virtue	   and	   prudence	   by	   means	   of	   educating	   the	   youth	   (παιδεύειν,	   209c).	   By	  portraying	  Kant	  as	  someone	  pregnant	  with	  an	  educational	  treatise,	  Hamann	  either	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  In	  Hamann,	  Fünf	  Hirtenbriefe	   (“Five	  Pastoral	  Letters”	   [1763]),	  Sämtliche	  Werke,	  6	  vols.,	   J.	  Nadler,	  ed.	  (Vienna:	  Herder,	  1950),	  2:	  369–74.	  My	  citations	  are	  from	  this	  edition.	  	  16	  On	   Hamann’s	   engagement	   with	   sexuality	   in	   relation	   to	   his	   general	   theories	   of	   language	   and	  knowledge,	  see	  Gwen	  Griffith-­‐Dickson,	  “God,	  I,	  and	  Thou:	  Hamann	  and	  the	  Personalist	  Tradition,”	  in	  
Hamann	   and	   the	   Tradition,	   Lisa	   Marie	   Anderson,	   ed.	   	   (Evanston:	   Northwestern	   University	   Press,	  2012),	  55–66.	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preserves	   Diotima’s	   distinction	   between	   somatic	   and	   soulful	   reproduction	   or	  cleverly	  allows	  both	  interpretations	  to	  converge.	  	   The	  letter	  eventually	  reveals	  Hamann’s	  main	  point.	  He	  points	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  writing	   for	  children,	  which	  he	  claims	  would	  require	   transforming	  oneself	   into	  a	  child,	  for	  only	  a	  childish	  author	  could	  communicate	  in	  a	  language	  understandable	  by	  children.	  Hamann	  then	  asks	  if	  Kant	  is	  truly	  up	  to	  this	  bold	  task.	  	  Sich	   ein	   Lob	   aus	   dem	  Munde	   der	   Kinder	   und	   Säuglinge	   zu	   bereiten!	   –	   an	   diesem	  Ehrgeiz	  und	  Geschmack	  Theil	  zu	  nehmen,	  ist	  kein	  gemeines	  Geschäfte,	  das	  man	  nicht	  mit	   dem	   Raube	   bunter	   Federn,	   sondern	   mit	   einer	   freywilligen	   Entäußerung	   aller	  Überlegenheit	   an	   Alter	   und	   Weisheit,	   und	   mit	   einer	   Verläugnung	   aller	   Eitelkeit	  darauf	  anfangen	  muß.	  Ein	  philosophisches	  Buch	  für	  Kinder	  würde	  daher	  so	  einfältig,	  thöricht	   und	   abgeschmackt	   aussehen	   müssen,	   als	   ein	   Göttliches	   Buch,	   das	   für	  Menschen	  geschrieben.	  Nun	  prüfen	  Sie	  sich,	  ob	  Sie	  so	  viel	  Herz	  haben,	  der	  Verfasser	  einer	   einfältigen,	   thörichten	   und	   abgeschmackten	   Naturlehre	   zu	   seyn?	   Haben	   Sie	  Herz,	  so	  sind	  Sie	  auch	  ein	  Philosoph	  für	  Kinder.	  Vale	  &	  sapere	  AVDE!	  (372)	  	  To	  manage	  to	  receive	  praise	  from	  the	  mouth	  of	  children	  and	  infants!	  –	  To	  take	  part	  in	   this	   ambition	   and	   taste	   is	   no	   ordinary	  business,	   which	   one	   must	   begin	   not	   by	  
stealing	   colored	   feathers,	   but	   rather	   by	   voluntarily	   relinquishing	   all	   superiority	   in	  age	   and	   wisdom	   and	   renouncing	   all	   vanity.	   A	   philosophical	   book	   for	   children,	  therefore,	  would	  necessarily	   appear	   as	   simplistic,	   foolish,	   and	   tasteless	   as	   a	  divine	  book	  written	  for	  human	  beings.	  Now	  test	  yourself:	  Do	  you	  have	  enough	  heart	  to	  be	  the	   author	   of	   a	   simplistic,	   foolish,	   and	   tasteless	   theory	   of	   nature?	   Take	   heart,	   for	  then	  you	  are	  also	  a	  philosopher	  for	  children.	  Vale	  et	  sapere	  AUDE!	  (85)	  	  Unlike	   Kant’s	   underage	   (unmündige)	   cowards,	   Hamann’s	   children	   and	   infants	  explicitly	  have	  a	  “mouth.”	   Is	  Kant	  capable	  of	  receiving	  praise	  “aus	  dem	  Munde	  der	  Kinder,”	   “from	   the	   mouth	   of	   children”?	   Hamann	   compares	   the	   proposed	   physics	  book	   for	   children	   to	   the	   Christian	   gospel,	   that	   “divine	   book	   written	   for	   human	  beings.”	   Thus,	   in	   considering	   Kant’s	   proposal,	   which	   the	   philosopher	   had	   hoped	  would	   rekindle	  his	   friend’s	  allegiance	   to	   the	  Enlightenment,	  Hamann	  stays	   true	   to	  his	  religious	  convictions,	  resorting	  to	  a	  reflection	  on	  the	  Christian	  mystery	  of	  divine	  kenosis	   and	   incarnation,	   of	   God’s	   self-­‐humiliation,	   his	   loving	   condescension	   to	  mankind.	  For	  Hamann,	  the	  philosopher	  who	  is	  willing	  to	  accommodate	  his	  scientific	  approach	  to	  the	  level	  of	  children	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  God	  who	  voluntarily	  descended	  to	  a	  less	  dignified	  state,	  to	  the	  God	  who	  “relinquished	  his	  superiority.”	  The	  proposed	  project—a	   children’s	   book	   of	   physics—would	   hardly	   be	   a	   testament	   to	   the	  accomplishments	   of	   rational	   investigation,	   but	   rather	   would	   rather	   appear	   as	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“simple,	  foolish,	  and	  tasteless”	  (einfältig,	  thöricht	  und	  abgeschmackt)	  as	  the	  Christian	  gospel	   was	   initially	   received:	   To	   cite	   the	   words	   from	   Paul’s	   First	   Epistle	   to	   the	  Corinthians:	   “for	   the	   Jews	   a	   stumbling	   block	   [σκάνδαλον]	   and	   for	   the	   Greeks	  foolishness	  [μωρίαν]”	  (1	  Cor.	  23).	  Does	  Kant	  have	  the	  “taste”	  to	  be	  so	  “tasteless,”	  the	  
Geschmack	  to	  be	  so	  abgeschmackt?	  Certainly,	  this	  would	  be	  no	  “ordinary	  or	  common	  or	  mean	  business”	  (kein	  gemeines	  Geschäfte).	  Indeed,	  would	  Kant	  dare	  to	  savor	  what	  common	  sense	  finds	  insipid?	  	  Throughout	   his	   writings,	   Hamann	   repeatedly	   had	   recourse	   to	   Paul’s	   verse	  from	  First	  Corinthians.	   In	   fact,	   they	  are	   inscribed	  on	  his	   tombstone	   in	  Münster,	   in	  the	  Latin	  Vulgate	  translation:	  	  
nos	   autem	   praedicamus	   Christum	   crucifixum	   Iudaeis	   quidem	   scandalum	   gentibus	  autem	  stultitiam,	  ipsis	  autem	  vocatis	  Iudaeis	  atque	  Graecis	  Christum	  Dei	  virtutem	  et	  Dei	   sapientiam,	   quia	   quod	   stultum	   est	   Dei	   sapientius	   est	   hominibus	   et	   quod	  infirmum	  est	  Dei	  fortius	  est	  hominibus	  (1	  Cor.	  23–25)	  But	  we	  preach	  Christ	   crucified,	   for	   the	   Jews	   a	   stumbling	  block	   and	   for	   the	  Greeks	  foolishness,	  but	  for	  those	  who	  have	  been	  called,	  both	  Jews	  and	  Greeks,	  Christ	  is	  the	  strength	  of	  God	  and	  the	  wisdom	  of	  God,	  because	  the	  foolishness	  of	  God	  is	  wiser	  than	  men	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	  God	  is	  stronger	  than	  men.	  	  Hamann’s	  closing	  imperative,	  lifted	  from	  Horace—sapere	  aude—thus	  provokes	  Kant	  to	  dare	  to	  taste	  and	  thereby	  acknowledge	  a	  foolishness	  that	  is	  wiser	  (sapientius),	  to	  dare	  to	  convert	  his	  mouth	  to	  a	  child’s	  mouth,	  in	  brief,	  to	  sense	  in	  his	  own	  mouth	  a	  Eucharistic	   economy	  of	   salvation	   that	   reason	  may	   judge	   to	   be	   immature,	  while	   in	  fact	  it	  exhibits	  an	  even	  higher	  maturity.	  	  	   Hamann	  therefore	  responds	  to	  Kant’s	  proposal	  with	  another	  proposal:	  Is	  the	  philosopher	  willing	   to	  humble	  himself	   in	   this	  manner	  or	  does	  he	  merely	  want	   “to	  adorn	   himself	   with	   borrowed	   plumes”—“sich	   mit	   fremden	   Federn	   schmücken”—like	  the	  jackdaw	  of	  the	  Aesopian	  fable	  who	  proudly	  flaunts	  himself,	  dressed	  with	  the	  plumage	   of	   other	   birds?	   Can	   rationalism	   ever	   be	   anything	   other	   than	   a	   vain	  philosophical	  practice	  that	  tries	  to	  pass	  off	  poetic	  quotations	  as	  one’s	  own	  material?	  Hamann,	  too,	  borrows	  plumes	  from	  other	  songbirds,	  but	  he	  does	  so	   in	  a	  decidedly	  different	  way,	  not	  as	  someone	  who	  proudly	  speaks	  as	  an	  assured	  agent	  of	  language,	  but	  rather	  as	  someone	  who	  speaks	  by	  listening	  to	  language.	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   Hamann	  frames	  his	  letter	  to	  Kant	  with	  two	  citations	  from	  Horace,	  who	  is	  thus	  brought	  in	  to	  bear	  witness	  to	  some	  truth.	  He	  begins	  with	  an	  epigraph	  from	  Horace’s	  
Odes	  and	  concludes	  with	  a	  line	  lifted	  from	  Horace’s	  Epistles.	  Hardly	  a	  rustic	  sap	  “who	  waits	   for	   the	   river	   to	   run	   off,”	   Kant	   is	   obliquely	   depicted	   as	   a	   lovesick	   boy	   who	  bravely	  plunges	  into	  the	  whirlpool	  of	  rational	  inquiry.	  Yet,	  Hamann	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that,	  although	  the	  philosopher	  struggles	  with	  one	  monster,	  he	  neglects	  to	  deal	  with	  another,	   perhaps	   more	   worthy	   opponent.	   Falling	   between	   Scylla	   and	   Charybdis,	  Kant	  is	  “miserable,”	  avoiding	  one	  danger,	  while	  exposing	  himself	  to	  a	  greater	  call.	  In	  this	  love	  letter,	  Hamann	  implies	  that	  Kant	  is	  “worthy	  of	  a	  better	  flame,”	  a	  love	  that	  would	  shipwreck	  his	  reasoned	  course.	  Yet,	  is	  the	  philosopher	  ready	  to	  swallow	  this	  difficult	  truth?	  For	  Hamann,	  the	  fact	  that	  Kant	  would	  propose	  to	  write	  a	  children’s	  book	   is	   encouraging;	   it	   inspires	   his	   love.	   For,	   “he	   who	   begins	   has	   half	   the	   deed	  done.”	  	  From	   this	   early	   exchange	   with	   Kant	   straight	   through	   to	   his	   Metacritique	   of	   the	  
Purism	   of	   Reason	   (1784),	   Hamann	   insisted	   on	   the	   messy	   materiality	   of	   language,	  fully	   recognizing	   that	   every	   repetitio	   sententiarum	   is	   necessarily	   a	   repetitio	  
verborum.	  This	  insistence	  is	  verified	  by	  Hegel’s	  assessment:	  “Hamann’s	  writings	  do	  not	  have	   a	   characteristic	   style	   so	  much	   as	   they	  are	   style	   through	   and	   through.”17	  Hegel	  points	  here	   to	   the	   inseparability	  of	   form	  and	  content,	  word	  and	   idea,	  which	  not	   only	  motivates	  Hamann’s	  use	  of	   citation	  beyond	  purposes	  of	   legitimization	  or	  ornamentation,	   but	   also	   corresponds	   to	   Hamann’s	   primary	   article	   of	   faith.	   For	  Hamann,	  it	  is	  vitally	  important	  to	  regard	  the	  incarnation	  of	  the	  Logos,	  as	  understood	  in	  Christian	  doctrine,	  not	  as	  mere	  embodiment	  or	  possession	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  perfect	  coincidence	   of	   the	   divine	   and	   the	   human.	   Consistently	   throughout	   his	   writings,	  Hamann	  warns	  against	  any	  slippage	  into	  Nestorianism,	  which	  sharply	  distinguishes	  between	   the	   god	   and	   the	  man.	   He	   also	   militates	   against	   Docetism,	   which	   fails	   to	  grasp	  the	  human	  depth	  of	  the	  incarnation	  and	  therefore	  the	  complete	  embodiment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Hegel’s	  review	  of	   	  Hamann	  first	  appeared	   in	   the	   Jahrbücher	   für	  wissenschaftliche	  Kritik,	  October	  and	  December	  1828.	  G.W.F.	  Hegel,	  “Hamanns	  Schriften,”	  in	  Werke,	  20	  vols.,	  E.	  Moldenhauer	  and	  K.M.	  Michel,	  ed.	  (Frankfurt	  a.M.:	  Suhrkamp,	  1969	  –	  71),	  11:	  275–352,	  here	  281.	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of	   God.	   As	   Chalcedonian	   orthodoxy	  would	   establish,	   Christ	   did	   not	  merely	  have	  a	  human	   body,	   he	  was	   a	   human	   body,	   just	   like	   ideas	   do	   not	   simply	   have	   words	   to	  express	   them,	   but	   rather	   are	   words,	   firmly	   grounded	   in	   historical	   and	   cultural	  situations.18	  	  In	  Hamann’s	  hands,	  citation	  both	  rests	  on	  Trinitarian	  doctrine	  and	  serves	  as	  a	   weapon	   against	   what	   he	   perceives	   as	   the	   anti-­‐historical	   position	   of	   the	  Enlighteners.19	  In	   his	   Socratic	   Memorabilia,	   addressed	   to	   Kant	   and	   Berens	   and	  published	  in	  1759,	  Hamann	  confesses	  his	  faith	  in	  the	  final	  paragraph:	  	  Ist	   es	   wahr,	   daß	   GOtt	   Selbst,	   wie	   es	   in	   dem	   guten	  Bekenntnisse	   lautet,	   das	   er	   vor	  Pilatus	  ablegte;	   ist	  es	  wahr,	   sage	   ich,	  daß	  GOtt	  Selbst,	  dazu	  ein	  Mensch	  wurde	  und	  
dazu	   in	   die	   Welt	   kam,	   daß	   er	   die	  Wahrheit	   zeugen	   möchte:	   so	   brauchte	   es	   keine	  Allwissenheit	   vorher	   zu	   sehen,	   daß	   er	   nicht	   so	   gut	  wie	   ein	   Sokrates	   von	  der	  Welt	  kommen,	  sondern	  eines	  schmählichern	  und	  grausameren	  Todes	  sterben	  würde,	  als	  der	   Vatermörder	   des	   allerchristlichen	   Königes,	   Ludwich	   des	   Vielgeliebten,	   der	   ein	  Urenkel	  Ludwich	  des	  Grossen	  ist.	  (2:	  82)	  	  If	  it	  is	  true	  that	  God	  Himself,	  as	  it	  reads	  in	  the	  good	  confession	  which	  he	  made	  before	  Pilate;	  if	  it	  is	  true,	  I	  say,	  that	  God	  Himself	  became	  man	  and	  came	  into	  the	  world,	  that	  
he	  might	   bear	  witness	   to	   the	   truth:	   if	   so,	   then	   it	   would	   require	   no	   omniscience	   to	  foresee	   that	   he	   would	   not	   escape	   from	   the	   world	   as	   well	   as	   Socrates,	   but	   rather	  would	  die	  a	  more	  humiliating	  and	  more	  cruel	  death	  than	  the	  parricide	  of	  that	  most	  
Christian	  king,	  Louis	  the	  Beloved,	  who	  is	  a	  great-­‐grandchild	  of	  Louis	  the	  Great.	  	  	  There	  is	  much	  that	  is	  notable	  about	  these	  concluding	  lines	  of	  Hamann’s	  peroration,	  which	  rashly	  moves	   from	  Christ’s	   interview	  with	  Pilate	  and	  the	  pronouncement	  of	  divine	  condescension	  to	  a	  pair	  of	  comparisons	  that	  shifts	   from	  the	  expected	  to	  the	  startling.	   Although	   it	   was	   not	   uncommon	   to	   correlate	   Socrates’	   martyrdom	   with	  Christ’s	  passion,	  the	  subsequent	  connection	  to	  the	  torture	  and	  cruel	  execution	  of	  the	  would-­‐be	  assassin,	  Robert	  François	  Damiens,	  amounts	  to	  an	  associative	  tailspin.	  It	  is	  this	   manner	   of	   thinking	   that	   Kant	   would	   find	   particularly	   troubling,	   an	  adventurousness	   that	   borders	   on	   recklessness.	   Yet,	   for	   Hamann,	   linking	   the	  Crucifixion	   to	   a	   regicide’s	   excruciating	   persecution	   forms	   exactly	   the	   kind	   of	  coincidence	   of	   opposites	   that	  Hamann	   found	   especially	   appealing,	   for	   it	   forcefully	  expresses	   the	   conjunction	   of	   an	   antithetical	   pair	   that	   confounds	   any	   “reasonable”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  On	   the	   importance	   of	   Trinitarian	   doctrine	   for	   Hamann’s	   theory	   of	   language,	   see	   Josef	   Nadler,	  
Johann	  Georg	  Hamann:	  Der	  Zeuge	  des	  Corpus	  Mysticum	  (Salzburg:	  Müller,	  1949):	  252	  –	  53.	  	  19	  Hamann	  is	  quite	  explicit	  on	  this	  point	  in	  his	  Hierophantische	  Briefe	  (1774).	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abstraction.	  The	  same	  effect	  obtains	  here,	   in	   the	   stylistic	  breach	   that	  occurs	  when	  sublime	  theological	  references	  yield	  to	  an	  appended	  and	  rather	  mundane	  account	  of	  the	   lineage	   of	   Louis	   XV. 20 	  The	   audacious	   foolishness	   of	   Hamann’s	   verbal	  assemblages	   testifies	   to	   the	   truth	   of	   divine	   condescension.	   Indeed,	   understood	  specifically	   as	   a	  man	   “who	  came	   into	   the	  world	   that	  he	  might	  bear	  witness	   to	   the	  truth,”	  Christ—as	  the	  Word	  Incarnate,	  as	  the	  amalgam	  of	  the	  highest	  and	  the	  basest,	  the	  divine	  and	  the	  mortal,	  the	  synchronic	  and	  the	  diachronic—is	  at	  least	  for	  Hamann	  the	  greatest,	  most	  powerful	  citation	  of	  all.	  	  	  	   Strikingly,	   Hamann	   concludes	   this	   critique	   of	   Enlightenment,	   dedicated	   to	  Kant	  and	  Berens—the	  two	  men	  who	  actively	  attempted	  to	  win	  him	  back	  to	  the	  side	  of	  Reason—with	  a	  rapid	  listing	  of	  three	  death	  sentences:	  the	  executions	  of	  Socrates,	  Christ,	  and	  Damiens.	  	  By	  summoning	  these	  figures	  on	  history’s	  death	  row,	  Hamann	  would	   seem	   to	   call	   attention	   to	   the	   lethal	   power	   of	   authorities.	   This	   gesture	  surprisingly	  anticipates	   the	   implicit	  problem	  discernible	   in	  Kant’s	   later	  Aufklärung	  essay,	   where	   the	   philosopher	   denounces	   the	   need	   for	   a	   Vormund	   only	   to	   install	  himself	  as	  a	  spokesman	  for	  the	  masses.	  In	  presuming	  guardianship	  for	  the	  masses,	  Kant	  unavoidably	  poses	  as	  the	  sovereign	  judge,	  who	  decides	  on	  what	  does	  and	  does	  not	   count	   as	   Enlightenment.	   What,	   then,	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   preface	   of	   Kant’s	   first	  
Critique,	  would	  differentiate	  the	  philosopher	  from	  the	  “despotic	  authority,”	  to	  whom	  “all	   must	   submit”?21	  Hamann	   already	   appears	   to	   warn	   against	   the	   consequences,	  should	  the	  masses	  refuse	  to	  assent	  to	  this	  reeducation	  program.	  Fairly	  or	  unfairly,	  in	  a	   highly	   suggestive	   fashion,	   Hamann	   modulates	   his	   interrogation	   of	   core	  Enlightenment	  beliefs	  into	  a	  blatant	  assignation	  of	  guilt.	  	  	  Culpability	  will	  continue	  to	  color	  Hamann’s	  engagement	  with	  his	  century’s	  strongest	  intellectual	  beliefs.	  Twenty-­‐five	  years	   later,	   in	  1784,	  upon	  reading	  Kant’s	  response	  to	   the	  question	  “Was	   ist	  Aufklärung?”,	  Hamann	  composes	  a	   long	   letter	   to	  his	  close	  friend	  Christian	  Jacob	  Kraus,	  a	  professor	  of	  practical	  philosophy	  and	  a	  colleague	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Cf.	  James	  C.	  O’Flaherty,	  Hamann’s	  Socratic	  Memorabilia:	  A	  Translation	  and	  Commentary	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1967):	  79.	  21	  Cf.	  Kant’s	  “Preface”	  to	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  Kritik	  der	  reinen	  Vernunft	  (1781),	  in	  Gesammelte	  Schriften,	  3:	  viii–xiv.	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Kant’s	   at	   Königsberg.	   The	   letter	   presses	   the	   terms	   of	   Kant’s	   main	   argument,	   in	  particular	   the	   question	   of	   “selbstverschuldete	   Unmündigkeit”	   (“self-­‐incurred	  immaturity”).	  To	  begin,	  he	  points	  out	   that	  an	  “inability”,	   like	   the	   inability	   to	  speak	  for	  oneself,	   is	  hardly	  a	  “fault”	  (Schuld),	  and	  then	  considers	  where	  this	  Schuld—this	  “guilt,	   debt,	   or	   fault”—in	   fact	   lies.	   His	   investigative	   eye	   falls	   on	   the	   anonymous	  “other”	  in	  Kant’s	  repeated	  phrase:	  “without	  guidance	  of	  another.”	  	  Wer	   ist	   aber	   der	   unbestimmte	   andere,	   der	   zweymal	   anonymisch	   vorkommt?	   […]	  Antwort:	   der	   leidige	   Vormund,	   der	   als	   das	   correlatum	   der	   Unmündigen	   implicite	  verstanden	   werden	   muß.	   Dies	   ist	   der	   Mann	   des	   Todes.	   Die	   selbstverschuldete	  Vormundschaft	  und	  nicht	  Unmündigkeit.22	  	  	  Who,	   however,	   is	   the	   indeterminate	   other,	   who	   twice	   appears	   anonymously?	   […]	  Answer:	  the	  wretched	  guardian,	  who	  must	  be	  implicitly	  understood	  as	  the	  correlate	  of	  those	  who	  are	  immature.	  This	  is	  the	  man	  of	  death.	  The	  self-­‐incurred	  guardianship	  and	  not	  immaturity.	  	  	  A	   century	   and	   a	   half	   before	   Adorno	   and	   Horkheimer,	   Hamann	   provides	   his	   own	  dialectic	  of	  Enlightenment	  by	  identifying	  the	  man	  of	  reason	  as	  the	  man	  of	  death.	  The	  one	   who	   preaches	   the	   universal	   light	   of	   reason	   is	   in	   fact	   the	   guilty	   party.	   In	  Hamann’s	   view,	   he	   is	   the	   one	  who	   is	   lazy	   and	   cowardly,	   someone	  who	   dubiously	  hides	  behind	  anonymity.	  As	  Hamann	  goes	  on	  to	  suggest,	  the	  guilt-­‐laden	  Vormund	  is	  complicit	   with	   political	   authorities,	   like	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   enlightened	   despot	  Frederick	  the	  Great,	  who	  claims	  to	  emancipate	  his	  people	  but	  only	  through	  thorough	  oppression,	   implementing	  the	  voice	  of	  Reason	  by	  silencing	  voices	  that	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  undignified,	  like	  the	  “entire	  fair	  sex.”	  As	  usual,	  Hamann	  has	  recourse	  to	  comic	  foolishness:	  So	   muß	   ich	   schon	   zu	   einem	   maccaronischen	   Gänsekiel	   meine	   Zuflucht	   nehmen,	  Ihnen	   meinen	   Dank	   für	   den	   beykommenden	   Berlinschen	   Christmonath	   im	   cant-­
style,	  den	  der	  komische	  Geschichtsschrieber	  der	  komischen	  Litteratur	  per	  e	  wie	  ein	  
Asmus	  cum	  puncto	  durch	  Kantschen	  Styl	  gegeben,	  zu	  übermachen.	  Zum	  Sapere	  aude!	  gehört	  auch	  aus	  eben	  derselben	  Qvelle	  das	  Noli	  admirari!	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Hamann	  to	  Christian	  Jacob	  Kraus,	  Dec.	  18,	  1784,	  in	  Johann	  Georg	  Hamann,	  Briefe,	  W.	  Ziesemer	  and	  A.	  Henkel,	  ed.	   (Frankfurt	  a.	  M.:	   Insel,	  1988),	  145	  –	  48;	  here,	  146.	  An	  English	   translation	   is	   found	   in	  Garret	   Green,	   Theology,	   Hermeneutics,	   and	   Imagination:	   The	   Crisis	   of	   Interpretation	   at	   the	   End	   of	  
Modernity	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  207–15.	  I	  have	  used	  Green’s	  translation,	  slightly	  modified,	  and	  refer	  to	  is	  excellent	  explanatory	  notes.	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Thus	   I	  must	  now	  take	  refuge	   in	  a	  macaronic	  quill,	   in	  order	   to	  bequeath	   to	  you	  my	  thanks	  for	  the	  enclosed	  Berlinsche	  Christmonath	  in	  the	  cant-­style,	  which	  the	  comic	  historian	  of	  comic	  literature	  has	  rendered	  as	  Kantian	  style	  per	  e,	  like	  an	  asmus	  cum	  
puncto.	  To	   the	  sapere	  aude!	  there	  belongs	  also	   from	  the	  very	  same	  source	   the	  Noli	  
admirari!	  	  	  Rather	   than	   assume	   the	   authoritative	   tone	   of	   a	   Kant,	   Hamann	   adopts	   the	   “cant”	  popularized	   by	   the	   Scottish	   clergyman,	   Andreas	   Cant,	   who	   preached	   to	   his	  uneducated	  congregation	  in	  low	  dialect.	  He	  thus	  makes	  his	  point	  by	  putting	  a	  dot	  on	  the	  first	  vertical	  stroke	  of	  the	  letter	  m	  to	  expose	  the	  asinus	  or	  “ass”	  in	  the	  discourse,	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  way	  a	  Hebrew	  scribe	  adds	  vowel	  points.	  The	  ass	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  Kant	  himself,	  who,	  in	  the	  same	  issue	  of	  the	  Berlinische	  Monatschrift	  in	  which	  his	  
Enlightenment	  essay	  appears	  (November	  1784),	  also	  published	  his	  essay,	  Idea	  for	  a	  
Universal	   History	   from	   a	   Cosmopolitan	   Point	   of	   View	   (“Idee	   zu	   einer	   allgemeinen	  Geschichte	   in	  weltbürgerlicher	  Absicht”),	   in	  which	   the	  philosopher	   accommodates	  his	  style	  to	  the	  cant	  of	  the	  Weltbürger.23	  	  That	  said,	  also	  somewhat	  like	  an	  ass,	  Hamann	  cheekily	  botches	  the	  final	  Latin	  citation:	  the	  famous	  opening	  of	  Horace’s	  Epistles	  1.6	  does	  not	  read	  Noli	  admirari	  but	  rather	  Nil	  admirari.	  	  
	   Nil	  admirari	  prope	  res	  est	  una,	  Numici,	  solaque	  quae	  possit	  facere	  et	  seruare	  beatum.	  	  (Epistle	  1.6.1–2)	  	  	   To	  marvel	  at	  nothing	  is	  almost	  the	  one	  thing,	  Numicius,	  	  And	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  can	  make	  and	  keep	  someone	  blessed.	  	  	  Is	  Hamann	  simply	  confused?	  Or	  is	  he	  not,	  rather,	  eager	  to	  have	  his	  addressee	  hear	  Horace’s	   advice	   as	   itself	   a	   quotation	   from	   Catullus,	   and	   thus	   as	   an	   asinine	   dig	   at	  Kant’s	  notorious	  bachelorhood?	  	  Noli	  admirari	  quare	  tibi	  femina	  nulla,	  Rufe,	  velit	  tenerum	  supposuisse	  femur,	  non	  si	  illam	  rarae	  labefactes	  munere	  vestis	  aut	  perluciduli	  deliciis	  lapidis.	  laedit	  te	  quaedam	  mala	  fabula,	  qua	  tibi	  fertur	  valle	  sub	  alarum	  trux	  habitare	  caper.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  the	  anonymous	  reader	  of	  my	  manuscript,	  who	  suggested	  this	  line	  of	  thinking.	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hunc	  metuunt	  omnes;	  neque	  mirum:	  nam	  mala	  valde	  est	  bestia,	  nec	  quicum	  bella	  puella	  cubet.	  quare	  aut	  crudelem	  nasorum	  interfice	  pestem,	  aut	  admirari	  desine	  cur	  fugiant.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   (Catullus	  69)	  	   Do	  not	  wonder	  why	  no	  woman,	  Rufus,	  wishes	  to	  place	  her	  soft	  thigh	  beneath	  you,	  not	  even	  if	  you	  should	  weaken	  her	  with	  a	  gift	  of	  rare	  clothes	  or	  with	  the	  delights	  of	  a	  pellucid	  gemstone.	  What	  hurts	  you	  is	  a	  certain	  bad	  story,	  which	  claims	  that	  under	  the	  valley	  of	  your	  armpits	  a	  wild	  billy-­‐goat	  lives.	  This	  is	  what	  everyone	  fears;	  and	  no	  wonder:	  for	  it’s	  really	  an	  evil	  beast,	  and	  no	  pretty	  girl	  wants	  to	  sleep	  with	  it.	  Therefore	  either	  kill	  this	  cruel	  plague	  of	  noses,	  or	  cease	  to	  wonder	  why	  they	  flee.	  	  	  Hamann,	  who	  explicitly	  states	  in	  his	  letter	  to	  Kraus	  that	  his	  three	  daughters	  would	  not	   react	   kindly	   to	   Kant’s	   dismissal	   of	   the	   “entire	   fair	   sex,”	  may	   be	   citing	   Horace	  incorrectly	   in	   order	   to	   adduce	   Catullus’s	   harsh	   imperative,	   which	   could	  subsequently	   remind	   Königsberg’s	   most	   famous	   bachelor	   that	   he	   has	   a	   body—a	  body	   that	   announces	   its	   presence	   to	   everyone	  with	   a	   nose.	   This	   recollection	   thus	  serves	  as	  an	  oblique	  cue	  to	  Jacob	  Christian	  Kraus,	  that	  he	  should	  “not	  marvel”	  at	  his	  colleague	   Kant	   (noli	   admirari),	   because	   his	   philosophy,	   in	   the	   final	   assessment,	  offers	   nothing	   worthy	   of	   admiration	   (nil	   admirari).	   As	   Hamann	   expresses	   it	   in	  another	  letter	  from	  1784:	  	  Doch	   die	   Pudenda	  unserer	   Natur	   hängen	  mit	   den	   Cammern	   des	   Herzens	   und	   des	  Gehirns	   so	  genau	  zusammen,	  daß	  eine	  zu	   strenge	  Abstraction	  eines	   so	  natürlichen	  Bandes	  unmöglich	  ist.24	  	  	  The	  pudenda	  of	  our	  nature	  are	  so	  closely	  connected	  with	  the	  chambers	  of	  the	  heart	  and	  the	  brain	  that	  too	  strict	  an	  abstraction	  of	  such	  a	  natural	  bond	  is	  impossible.	  	  Rather	  than	  traffic	  in	  ideas	  stripped	  of	  a	  body,	  Hamann	  allows	  the	  flesh	  to	  come	  out	  of	  cowardly	  hiding,	  so	  as	  to	  reveal	  that	  a	  repetitio	  sententiae	  is	  necessarily	  a	  repetitio	  
verborum,	   that	   the	   free	   use	   of	   our	   reason,	   which	   demands	   the	   subordination	   of	  language	   to	   thought,	   invariably	   entails	   a	   lethal	   abstraction,	   one	   that	   is	   at	   fault,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Hamann	  to	  Johann	  Friedrich	  Hartknoch,	  July	  24,	  1784,	  in	  Briefe,	  113.	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insofar	  as	   it	  divorces	  the	  mind	  from	  the	  body.	  For	  Hamann,	  daring	  to	  know	  would	  indeed	  be	  fatal,	  should	  it	  fail	  in	  daring	  to	  savor	  the	  incarnate	  truth.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
